Once Upon A Bit

Today’s case-study is pretty short – you are going to get its intention in a matter of seconds.
We are going to talk about observation, and about the slight difference between a no-bug to a major security issue.

Every security research requires respectful amounts of attention and distinction. That’s why there are no successful industrial automatic security testers (excluding XSS testers) – because machines cannot determine all kinds of security risks. As a matter of fact, machines cannot feel danger or detect it. There is no one way for a security research to be conducted against a certain targets. The research parameters are different and varies from the target. Some researches end after a few years, some researches end after a few days and some researches end after a few minutes. This case-study is of the last type. The described bug was so powerful and efficient (to the attacker), that no further research was needed in order to get to the goal.

A very famous company, which, among all the outstanding things it does, provides security consulting to a few dozens of industrial companies and  start-ups, asked us to test its’ “database” resistance. Our goal was to leak the names of the clients from a certain type of collection – not SQL-driven one (we still haven’t got the company’s approval to publish it’s name or the type of vulnerable data collection).

So, after a few minutes of examining the queries which provide information from the data collection, I understood that the name of the data row is a must in order to do a certain action about it. If the query-issuer (=the user who asks the information about the row) has permissions to see the results of the query – a 200 OK response is being returned. If he doesn’t – again – a 200 OK response is being returned.

At first I thought that this is a correct behavior. Whether the information exists in the data collection or not – the same response is being returned.
BUT THEN, Completely by mistake, I opened the response to the non existent data row in the notepad.

The end of the 200 OK response contained an unfamiliar, UTF-8 char – one that shouldn’t be there. The length of the response from the non existent data row request was longer in 1 bit!

At first, I was confused. Why does the response to a non-existent resource contains a weird character at the end of it?
I was sure that there is a JS code which checks the response, and concludes according to that weird char – but there wasn’t.

This was one of the cases where I cannot fully explain the cause of the vulnerability, because of a simple reason – I don’t see the code behind.

The company’s response, besides total shock to the our fast response, was that “apparently, when a non-existent resource is being requested from the server, a certain sub-process which searches for this resource in the data collection fires-up and encounters a memory leak. The result of the process, by rule, should be an empty string, but when the memory leak happens, the result is a strange character. The same one which is being added to the end of the response.

Conclusion
Making your code run a sub-process, a thread or, god forbid, an external 3rd-party process is a very bad practice.
I know that sometimes this is more convenient and it can save a lot of time, but whenever you are using another process – you cannot fully predict its results. Remember – it can crush, freeze, force-closed by the OS or by some other process (anti-virus?).
If you must use a thread or sub-process, at least do it responsibly – make sure the OS memory isn’t full, the arguments that you pass to the process, the process’s permission to run and its possible result scenarios. Don’t ever allow the process to run or execute critical commands basing on user input information.